Maroc - EURASIAREVIEW.COM - A la une - 26/12/2025 17:37

Gaza: Why The Delay? – OpEd

On September 30, the day after President Trump’s ceasefire plan for Gaza was ​launched, ​ a report in the National – the English language journal published in the United Arab Emirates​ – ​described the plan as “booby-trapped” because “every provision in the plan is kind of tied to other provisions.”​  That observation is true enough, but the 20-point plan embodies a further weakness – the omission of a timetable for completing ​each of the three stages envisaged.   The inter-dependence between the various provisions of the plan, together with the lack of a clear deadline for the achievement of each stage, have together resulted in its progress being slowed to a snail’s pace. Under the plan, the first phase required a cessation of hostilities and then, over the next 72 hours, the release by Hamas of all living hostages together with the remains of the deceased.  Meanwhile Israel would free Palestinian prisoners, aid and relief would flow into Gaza under international supervision, and most IDF troops would withdraw to an agreed “yellow line”.   This yellow line refers to a non-physical demarcation boundary, drawn on a map of the region, marking the initial phase of Israel's partial withdrawal from parts of the enclave. This line divides Gaza into two roughly equal zones – Hamas to the west; the IDF to the east.  In some areas Israeli forces have marked the line with yellow concrete blocks, but because the blocks do not precisely align with the agreed demarcation, a certain amount of confusion reigns​ on the ground. Unfortunately, without a built-in requirement to complete the various stages of phase one within a given period, or sanctions against failure to comply, the plan as a whole has simply lost impetus.  Nor is there any incentive for either Hamas or the Israeli government to remedy the situation. Both are using ambiguity over these conditions to preserve leverage ahead of talks on stage two, where the core disputes over ​Hamas disarmament, ​the interim governance of Gaza, ​​deployment of an international armed force, and further IDF withdrawal are featured. Hamas decided to maintain its bargaining power by spreading the release of the deceased hostages over several weeks.  It still holds the remains of Ran Givili, the Israeli police officer who reportedly eliminated 14 terrorists before he was killed and his body taken to Gaza​.  ​While it does so, stage one of the ceasefire is not completed.  At the same time, Hamas continues to tell the world about civilian deaths – “civilians” or “women and children”  is how they classify those killed in Gaza, never ​enumerating the deaths of fighters as such. ​ Fighters aged 17 or under are classed as children.  Israel, for its part, continues to report daily clashes with Hamas.  ​The targeted killing of senior Hamas leader Ra'ad Sa'ad on December 13 aroused Trump's ire, but in the event it did not deter him from declaring on December 17 that, after 3000 years, he had brought peace to the Middle East.  Meanwhile difficulties are emerging which threaten the success of later stages of the plan. Phase two envisages the creation of a council of independent Palestinian technocrats to run the day-to-day affairs of Gaza under international supervision.  It also provides for the creation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) made up of US, Arab and European personnel to oversee demilitarization and maintain security.   To take the last matter first, as of now many countries asked to contribute troops or personnel have failed to respond or are hesitating, citing concerns about an unclear mandate, or the risk of confrontations with Hamas fighters. On November 29, the Washington Post reported that Azerbaijan, which had been among the countries expected to contribute troops, is now tying any participation to a complete halt in fighting and a clear mandate.  Indonesia, which had earlier indicated it could provide up to 20,000 peacekeeping personnel, has clarified that this figure represented overall capacity rather than a firm commitment and is now considering a very much reduced initial contribution. Meanwhile, despite the force being described diplomatically as “Arab-led,” ​to date no​t a single Arab government has formally committed troops.​  Several Arab countries previously mentioned as potential contributors, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have either declined or expressed increased reluctance to deploy forces, citing political sensitivities.  Even for states keen to win favor with the US administration, the Post reports, many uncertainties remain, including the thorny question of how the force would go about de-weaponizing Hamas, which has sent mixed signals about its willingness to disarm. ​The US “want the international stabilizing force to come into Gaza,” said a senior official in Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “and restore​, quote unquote​, “law and order”, and disarm any resistance. So that’s the problem. Nobody wants to do that.” So while Trump’s ceasefire plan has broad regional and international backing, especially from the mediators Qatar, Egypt and Turkey, its long-term prospects remain uncertain.  The situation was not improved by the disappointing and inconclusive results of the large USled planning conference​, held on December 16 under US Central Command auspices​, on ​the International Stabilization Force for postwar Gaza.  More than 25 nations were represented, but it ended without firm decisions on the force’s mandate or concrete troop pledges.  In addition to that issue, many of the most controversial or sensitive components of phase two, including the disarmament of Hamas, transitional governance, the future status of Gaza and wider Palestinian political questions, also remain unresolved and contentious. If the international force never deploys, or deploys in a limited, ineffective way, there is a real danger the ceasefire becomes a “frozen conflict” — and Gaza is subjected to a prolonged stalemate, a hark back to the “managed instability” that marked the pre-October 7 period.  History has already demonstrated what that situation finally leads to. If Hamas refuses or delays disarmament, or Israel is unwilling to withdraw fully, the underlying structural problems – the vacuum in governance and security, and the humanitarian crisis– will remain, and the truce could collapse.  In those circumstances, the ceasefire may only delay, not end, the conflict.